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 SOCK-YONG PHANG
 REX S. TOH
 Road Congestion Pricing in
 Singapore: 1975 to 2003
 Abstract
 Facing traffic congestion in the Central Business District and enormous demands on scarce
 land resources by the growing number of motor vehicles, Singapore, a small island city-state
 the size of Seattle, embarked on a bold decision to reduce road congestion by implementing the
 famous Area Licensing Scheme in 1975. This was a manual system of tolls for multiple entries
 into the Restricted Zone. While achieving the intended effect of cutting down on the volume of
 vehicular traffic in the Restricted Zone, the authors (and others) found that the problem of
 congestion had merely shifted in time and place. Many changes were implemented, including
 shoulder pricing (reduced tolls before and after the peak period) to even out traffic flows in
 1994, and the Weekend Car Scheme (1991) and Off Peak Car Scheme (1994) to encourage people
 to use the roads during off-peak hours. The Road Pricing Scheme was introduced in 1995 on a
 congested highway to familiarize the public with linear passage tolls.
 In 1998, Singapore discarded the manual system of road pricing in favor of Electronic Road
 Pricing, which permitted the charging of tolls per entry, based on vehicle size, route taken, and
 time of the day. This article traces the rationale for the various measures and discusses the
 successes and shortcomings for the various measures over a twenty-eight year period from 1975
 to 2003.
 Singapore is an island city-state, about 685
 square km in area, strategically located at the
 crossroads of commerce and tourism at the
 southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. With a pop
 ulation of around 4.17 million, it has a very high
 population density of about 6,086 persons per
 square km. Economic growth has been impres
 sive over the past three decades, averaging about
 8 percent per year. Singapore's per capita gross
 domestic product in 2002 was S$37,333 or
 US$20,856 (where US$1 = S$1.79), a level
 comparable to that of the United States and most
 western countries. From a transportation per
 spective, this economic success has not come
 without a price. Because the country is hot and
 humid, the demand for air-conditioned private
 transportation is very high and income-elastic.
 To allocate rights to car ownership and us
 age, Singapore has combined market mecha
 nisms with taxation and active restrictions de
 signed to contain traffic congestion. The
 rationale for such an approach is simple: Roads
 already constitute 12 percent of the island's
 area, about the same percentage as housing, so
 room for continued expansion is clearly
 limited.
 This article provides an overview and analy
 sis of the road congestion measures adopted
 over the last three decades: the Area Licensing
 Scheme (ALS) and Road Pricing Scheme
 (RPS); the Weekend Car Scheme, which was
 replaced by the Off-Peak Car Scheme; and
 Electronic Road Pricing, which replaced the
 ALS and RPS.
 Area Licensing Scheme
 In the early 1970s, the problem of traffic
 congestion, especially with the unrestrained
 growth of car ownership due to rapidly rising
 incomes, was perceived to be serious (Smith
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 1974). In 1975, during the morning and eve
 ning rush hours, traffic in the Central Business
 District (CBD)?one of the most congested
 parts of the city, with an area of about 5.59
 square kilometers?crawled at an average
 speed of only 19 km per hour. The authorities
 decided, among other things, to dissuade the
 entry of private passenger cars and taxis into
 the CBD during the morning peak by instituting
 a manual system of toll collection. The famous
 Area Licensing System (ALS), the world's first
 comprehensive road pricing scheme, was born.
 The ALS was implemented in June 1975,
 defining a Restricted Zone (RZ) in the CBD
 with initially twenty-two vehicular entry points
 manned by human monitors. All vehicles ex
 cept those in the exempt categories (public
 service and military vehicles, goods vehicles,
 motorcycles, and buses) were required to buy
 and display a special paper license in the form
 of a mountable decal (obtainable from roadside
 sales booths), costing S$3 per day or S$60 per
 month (company-registered cars pay double)
 in order to enter the RZ during the restricted
 times from 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Monday
 through Saturday. The original target was to
 reduce traffic volumes by between 25 percent
 and 30 percent during the morning peak hours.
 It was also hoped that the morning restrictions
 would have a "mirror image" effect on the
 evening return flow.
 To encourage carpooling, vehicles with four
 or more passengers were exempted. Parking
 fees in the RZ were raised by almost 100 per
 cent, and the Park-and-Ride Scheme was im
 plemented, under which motorists could park
 their cars for a small fee in fifteen fringe car
 parks with a total of 15,000 parking spaces,
 and then shuttle into the city center.
 Theory of Road Pricing
 The theoretical foundations of road conges
 tion pricing for allocative efficiency are well
 documented (see Toh 1977; Toh and Phang
 1997). Economists argue that traffic congestion
 arises because marginal users of a crowded
 road consider only their private cost and ignore
 the fact that their vehicles slow down and in
 convenience others?thus the marginal social
 cost exceeds the marginal private cost. There
 fore economists argue for a Pigovian toll (Pi
 gou 1920) on the use of congested roads to
 increase the individual cost of usage by an
 amount equal to the external diseconomies im
 posed by one driver on all others, in order to
 equate marginal social cost with marginal so
 cial benefit. Hau (1992) provides an excellent
 comprehensive review of the theory of road
 pricing.
 Initial Results
 Table 1 documents the entry of motor vehi
 cles into the RZ according to different peak
 periods. Note that by the fourth week of opera
 tion, the total number of motor vehicles enter
 ing the RZ during the original restricted times
 fell by a phenomenal 43 percent, causing un
 derutilized roads, wholly on account of the 76.2
 percent reduction in the number of non-exempt
 cars (see Table 1).
 Three new traffic patterns had emerged.
 First, affected motorists shifted their trips to
 just before and just after the restricted hours
 to avoid the ALS fee. Second, the usual morn
 ing peak hour traffic was diverted to new "es
 cape corridors" around and bypassing the RZ.
 Third, the "mirror image" effect hoped for
 did not materialize because motorists were not
 compelled to retime their exits from the RZ in
 the evening. Moreover, those who took circu
 itous routes to their destination in the morning
 added to the cross-town traffic in the evening.
 Summarizing, the introduction of the ALS
 had the following results. First, there was
 wasteful under utilization of the roads in the
 RZ during the restricted hours, resulting in the
 rationing of resources that were no longer
 scarce. Second, the problem of traffic conges
 tion had not been eliminated-it had merely
 been shifted in time and location. Third, motor
 ists were inconvenienced by being compelled
 to stagger their trips and work hours, and in
 curred higher costs by traveling longer dis
 tances to circumvent the RZ. Fourth, there was
 an increase in the number of exempt goods
 vehicles to avoid paying the fees (note that in
 Table 1 the reduction in the "other vehicles
 category" was primarily due to the reduction
 in the number of non-exempt taxis entering
 the RZ).
 Given the initial results, all indications
 pointed toward a reduced toll for improved
 efficiency. But on August 1, 1975, the re
 stricted hours were extended by forty-five mi
 nutes to 10:15 a.m. The total number of motor
 vehicles entering the RZ during the extended
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 Table 1. Motor Vehicles Entering the RZ Before and After the ALS_
 _Motor Cars_Other Vehicles_Total_
 Time March 1975 June 1975 March 1975 June 1975 March 1975 June 1975
 (Before ALS) (After ALS) (Before ALS) (After ALS) (Before ALS) (After ALS)
 7:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.
 (Before Restricted 5,384 6,565 4,146 5,011 9,800 11,576
 Hours) (+21.9%) (+13.5%) (+18.1%)
 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. 32,421 7,727 22,892 22,545 55,313 30,272
 (Restricted Hours) (-76.2%) (-1.5%) (-45.3%)
 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. 7,059 7,479 5,716 7,561 12,775 15,040
 (After Restricted Hours)_(+5.9%)_(+32.3%)_(+17,7%)
 Sources: Adapted from the "New Time Limits," New Nation, July 10, 1975
 restricted hours fell from a March 1975 (pre
 ALS) daily average of 74, 000 to an October
 1975 (post-ALS) daily average of 41,500,
 amounting to a 44 percent reduction in total
 traffic-more than the targeted 25 to 30 percent
 reduction. Also, on December 31, 1975, the
 daily ALS fee for private cars was increased
 from S$3 to S$4, and then to S$5 on March 1,
 1980, again with double rates on company cars.
 Further Developments
 The total number of motor vehicles entering
 the RZ during the hours of operation increased
 from a daily average of 41,500 in October 1975
 to 51,000 in 1988, clearly a move toward opti
 mality. However, many changes were imple
 mented on June 1, 1989. Because the "mirror
 image" reduction of traffic in the morning did
 not materialize, the ALS was extended to the
 evening peak hours from 4:30 p.m. to 7:30
 p.m. (later shortened to 6:30 p.m.) on Mondays
 through Fridays. The toll was reduced from
 S$5 to S$3, but carpools, private and school
 buses, commercial vehicles, and motorcycles
 were now required to pay the ALS fee to enter
 the RZ, leaving only scheduled buses, police,
 military, and emergency vehicles on the ex
 empt list.
 All of these reduced evening inbound traffic
 by 44 percent. By November 1989, the number
 of motor vehicles entering the RZ during the
 operating hours in the morning had fallen 14
 percent to 43,700, almost the same level as in
 October 1975, soon after implementation of
 the ALS. The government announced that the
 average speed along the major roads within the
 RZ had increased by 20 percent. In May 1991
 the average motor vehicle speed during peak
 hours in the city center had reached 35 kph,
 compared to only 10 kph in New York and 18
 kph in London. In other words, the roads had
 once again been emptied out.
 Traffic surveys in November 1992 revealed
 that demand for entry into the RZ was higher
 just before the restricted hours than during
 them. To smooth out the peaks and troughs, in
 January 1994 the government responded to this
 distortion by introducing Whole Day ALS from
 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. from Monday to Friday,
 and from 7:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (later shortened
 to 2:00 p.m.) on Saturday, with a two-tier
 shoulder pricing system (this refers to reduced
 tolls during the "shoulder" periods immedi
 ately before and after the peak demand times).
 Motorist were allowed to purchase part-day
 licenses for S$2, which were good from 10:15
 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Friday, and
 from 10:15 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Saturday.
 The results were exactly as predicted and
 hoped for. After the shoulder-priced Whole Day
 ALS was implemented, half an hour before and
 after the previous two-tier restricted periods,
 traffic volumes went down, and half an hour into
 and before the end of the two-tier restricted peri
 ods, traffic volumes went up. Furthermore, after
 the implementation of the Whole-Day ALS,
 morning traffic increased from 49,000 to 60,000
 vehicles, afternoon traffic decreased from
 168,000 to 143,000 vehicles, and evening traffic
 increased from 28,000 to 34,000 vehicles. These
 results suggest that it is possible to smooth out
 the peaks and valleys in traffic volumes by ap
 propriate timing and shoulder pricing of tolls,
 which reduces the incentive to bunch up travel
 during unrestricted hours.
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 Table 2. The Initial Singapore ALS and Subsequent Modifications
 Implementation date
 Initial Scheme
 2 June 1975
 23 June 1975
 I August 1975
 Subsequent Changes
 I January 1976
 1 April 1977
 1 March 1980
 13 February 1984
 19 November 1986
 1 June 1989
 1 July 1989
 1 December 1989
 31 January 1990
 3 January 1994
 2 May 1995
 Weekday hours
 of operation
 7:30 a.m.-9:30 a.m.
 7:30 a.m.-10:15 a.m.
 Daily license fee in Singapore Dollars
 Company Commercial
 Private Car Car* Taxi Vehicle Motorcycle
 7:30 a.m.-10:15 a.m.
 4:30 p.m.-7:00 p.m.
 7:30 a.m.-10:15 a.m.
 4:30 p.m.-6:30 p.m.
 Whole Day license
 M-F: 7:30 a.m.
 6:30 p.m.
 Sat: 7:30 a.m.
 3:00 p.m.
 Part Day license
 M-F: 10:15 a.m.
 4:30 p.m.
 Sat: 10:15 a.m.
 3:00 p.m.
 Restricted hours end at
 2:00 p.m. instead of
 3:00 p.m. on Sat
 4
 5
 0
 8 4
 2
 10
 6 3
 6 3
 4 2
 0  0
 0.70
 * No tax allowance/deductions are allowed for cost/expenses incurred by motor cars registered
 as company (business service) passenger vehicles from April 1, 1998. With this
 rationalization, the tax rates/fees on company cars are now similar to those for private cars.
 Sources: Gomez-Ibanez and Small (1994), p.70, and The Strait Times, various dates.
 Reprinted from Phang and Toh (1997).
 Since its inception, the ALS has undergone
 numerous modifications to the restricted hours,
 fees, and categories of restricted and exempt ve
 hicles. These are shown in Table 2.
 Road Pricing Scheme
 A Road Pricing Scheme (RPS) was intro
 duced on the East Coast Parkway (an express
 way) in June 1995, partly to familiarize Singa
 poreans with linear passage tolls. Between 7:30
 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. on weekdays except public
 holidays, drivers of all vehicles except sched
 uled buses, police, and emergency vehicles en
 tering the East Coast Parkway at two locations
 were required to purchase and display an RPS
 license costing S$.50 a day for motorcycles
 and S$l a day for other vehicles. Again, the
 monthly license was twenty times the cost of
 the daily license, double for company-regis
 tered cars. A valid ALS license may be used
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 in lieu of an RPS license. The implementation
 of the RPS resulted in a significant reduction
 in traffic volume from 12,400 vehicles in May
 1995 to 7,300 vehicles in August 1995 during
 the restricted hours. Travel speeds increased
 from an average of 29 kph to 64 kph on the
 expressway.
 Successes and Shortcomings
 of the ALS/RPS
 As discussed above, the ALS and RPS had
 succeeded in curbing road congestion in the
 CBD and East Coast Parkway, increased travel
 speeds, and also led to a modal shift from
 private transportation to public transit, which
 increased its share from 33 percent in pre-ALS
 days to 69 percent. But the well-intentioned
 objective of clearing congested roads may have
 worked too well. The prices were considered
 to be above the optimal rate, since the initial
 45 percent reduction in traffic during the peak
 hours in the RZ far exceeded the original target
 of a 25 to 30 percent reduction, leading to
 underutilized roads.
 Studies done on the ALS in the 1970s, 1980s,
 and 1990s (Armstrong-Wright 1986; McCar
 thy and Tay 1993; Toh 1977; 1992; Watson
 and Holland 1978; Wilson 1988) all arrived at
 the same conclusion. Toh (1977) and Wilson
 (1988) noted the congestion had shifted to just
 before and after the restricted hours and to the
 peripheral ring roads. Henderson (1985) notes
 that people who retime their entry into the RZ
 to avoid the fees may incur implicit scheduling
 costs due to inconveniences, and Wilson (1988)
 adds that those who shifted to just before and
 after the restricted hours adversely affected
 those who normally travel during those times,
 and further noted that those who had switched
 to buses contributed to increased travel times
 for all bus riders. Thus, using the Nash social
 welfare function as well as the Bentham and
 Sen welfare measures1 and World Bank data,
 he showed that all three measures indicated a
 decline in overall welfare.
 Contrary to all earlier findings, a relatively
 recent study by Li (1999), based on the values
 of time relevant to car drivers rather than the
 general population, and incorporating the re
 sults of other research on the values people
 attach to time in driving and time while waiting
 at intersections, claimed that by 1990, the $3.00
 ALS fee was not too high. This was based
 on 511 car trips measured during a three-day
 period in February 1990, showing that the aver
 ge number of vehicles per lane per hour in the
 Restricted Zone was 450 during the restricted
 hours and 600 during the unrestricted hours.
Two reasons that may explain Li's contradic
 tory findings is that he used the average wage
 rate for car owners, which is higher than the
 average national wage rate, and the study was
 done with data collected in 1990, fully fifteen
 years after the ALS and the $3.00 fee were
 implemented.
 Capital Costs and Revenues
 Manual road pricing (using human observers
 stationed at gantries) in Singapore had
 achieved its intended effect of restraining traf
 fic volumes during peak hours and within con
 gested areas and expressways. Whether it went
 oo far has been debated. But what is undeni
 able is that the alleviation of traffic congestion
 has been achieved at minimal capital and op
 erating costs. Capital costs associated with the
 original ALS totaled S$6.6 million in 1975,
 while capital costs for the revised ALS in 1989
 amounted to only S$.17 million. In contrast,
 revenues from the sale of area licenses
 amounted to S$47 million in fiscal year 1993,
 while expenses related to selling, enforcement,
 and maintenance were only 9 percent of reve
 nues. Thus the ALS, for all its successes and
 shortcomings, was efficiently put into place
 and maintained.
 Weekend Car Scheme and Off-Peak
 Car Scheme
 In May 1991, Singapore implemented an
 unusual program called the Weekend Car
 Scheme (WCS) to encourage the use of cars
 only during non-congested off-peak periods.
 Motorists were given financial incentives such
 as a 70 percent discount on the annual road
 ax and rebates on the registration fee and im
 port duty if they registered their cars as week
 end cars, which can be used only from 3:00
 p.m. on Saturday and the whole of Sunday and
 public holidays, as well as from 7:00 p.m. to
 7:00 a.m. on weekdays. These cars are identi
 fied by red license plates fixed with tamper
 roof special screws and coded seals, which if
 replaced by a false normal license plate would
 lead to a minimum fine equal to twice the
 annual road tax. If a weekend car is caught
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 being used during restricted hours, the mini
 mum fine is equal to the annual road tax. To
 accommodate emergencies, the owner of each
 weekend car is given five free daily coupons
 per year, and additional daily coupons can be
 purchased for S$20 each.
 Although the WCS was implemented in re
 sponse to popular public demand and was well
 intentioned, it had unintended effects. Owners
 of luxury cars as well as households owning
 more than one car benefited the most from the
 scheme. The owner of a Porsche 911 (3,600
 cc) would enjoy a S$4,400 saving on the annual
 road tax, which alone would pay for a lot of
 S$20 daily licenses. The redistribution effects
 were thus widely perceived to be unfair to the
 less wealthy. The Malaysian government also
 announced that it would not allow Singapore
 registered weekend cars to use Malaysian roads
 during the hours of restriction that would have
 applied in Singapore-perhaps fearing they
 were so registered for this very purpose.
 Responding to public dissatisfaction with the
 side effect such as rich people purchasing lux
 ury weekend cars for daily use, the government
 revamped the scheme in October 1994. The
 new Off-Peak Car Scheme (OPCS) with the
 same hours of restriction offered the same in
 centives regardless of car engine capacity?a
 flat S$800 discount on the annual road tax,
 among other things.
 Electronic Road Pricing
 As previously described, the ALS/RPS was
 successful in curbing urban congestion in Sin
 gapore. But the schemes were manually oper
 ated and had become more complicated over
 time, with sixteen types of licenses (Whole
 Day, Part-Day, ALS/RPS/OPCS, and daily and
 monthly licenses for three categories of re
 stricted vehicles, privately and company
 owned). Motorists had to figure out what type
 of license to buy, and visual enforcement by
 the police had become difficult, as vehicles
 were not obliged to slow down as they ap
 proach the gantry (entry) points. Moreover, the
 different licenses could be illegally switched
 among vehicles, and enforcement in this regard
 was by the honor system. The ALS and RPS
 were also labor-intensive, requiring more than
 120 personnel to manage the system and man
 the 35 gantries. But perhaps the most important
 drawback of the ALS/RPS from the perspective
 of allocative efficiency pertains to the unlim
 ited number of entries into the RZ, resulting
 in under-penalized contributions to traffic con
 gestion, and making it difficult to equate mar
 ginal social benefits to marginal social costs
 (Walters 1961). This was the motivation to
 switch to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP).
 Following many years of trials and extensive
 preparation, the government achieved a smooth
 transition from the ALS/RPS to ERP between
 April and September 1998, at an initial cost of
 S$200 million (less than S$300 per vehicle in
 the then existing fleet). The technology in
 volves a combination of radio frequency, opti
 cal detection, imaging, and smart card technol
 ogies. Transponders called In-vehicle Units
 (IUs) are fitted permanently on the windscreen
 of vehicles, and each IU is unique to each
 vehicle. Half of the total S$200 million cost
 of the ERP scheme was for the fitting of IUs,
 which was provided free of charge to vehicles.
 Motorists have to insert smart cash debit cards
 into the IU before making trips that will involve
 ERP charging. Foreign vehicles from Malaysia
 entering Singapore at three possible entry
 points (two land connections and a ferry termi
 nal) may rent temporary IUs at designated ser
 vice outlets. Regular visitors have found it
 more cost-effective to purchase and fit a perma
 nent IU to their vehicles.
 ERP relies on a pair of gantries where the
 first gantry has antennas that check smart cards
 on approaching vehicles and then debits the
 cards, without the vehicle having to slow down.
 The second gantry pinpoints the location of the
 vehicle, identifies the vehicle type, and verifies
 that the correct deduction has been made. The
 IU has a liquid crystal display indicating the
 smart card's stored value balance, and confirms
 every transaction with a beep. No central bill
 ing is involved. A controller links information
 from the antennas and detectors to check for
 possible violations (no smart card or insuffi
 cient balance on the card), and a camera trans
 mits an image of the rear license plate to a
 central computer in the event of a violation. The
 fine for a violation (no cash card or insufficient
 balance) is an administrative surcharge of S$10
 plus the ERP charge, payable within two weeks
 of the violation.
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 ERP charges are levied on a per-pass basis.
 Charges vary by type of vehicle, time, and
 location. All vehicles except for emergency
 vehicles (ambulances, fire engines, and police
 cars) are subject to ERP. Charges by vehicle
 type vary according to their Passenger Car Unit
 (PCU), defined as the road space occupied by
 the moving vehicle with respect to a moving
 car. The PCU ratings for various categories of
 vehicles were determined in a study done by
 Fan et al. (1997). Thus motorcycles have a
 PCU of 0.5 and their ERP rates are half of that
 for cars (PCU of 1.0) for the same time period
 and location. Big trucks with a PCU of 2.0
 have ERP rates twice of that for cars.
 Initially (September 1998) the location of the
 ERP gantries duplicated the ALS/RPS gantries
 and charges were lower at between S$0.50 and
 S$2.50; the charge for the ALS was S$3.00
 for peak periods and S$2.00 for the inter-peak
 period. However, traffic volume into the CBD
 initially fell by about 10-15 percent during the
 ERP operation hours, as compared to the ALS
 scheme. This was a result of a reduction in
 multiple trips made using the same ALS pass,
 estimated at about 23 percent of trips into the
 CBD during the ALS days (Chin 2002).
 A year later (September 1999), ERP was
 extended to another seven locations along ex
 pressways and the outer ring road area. As of
 January 2003, the ERP system has a total of
 forty-five gantries covering the Restricted
 Zone (operating Mondays to Fridays between
 7:30 a.m. and 7:30 p.m.), four expressways,
 and four major arterial roads (operating Mon
 days to Fridays between 7:30 a.m. and 9:30
 a.m.).
 Starting from April 1999, the Land Transport
 Authority (LTA) instituted a regular ERP rate
 review mechanism. LTA conducts quarterly
 travel speed reviews to adjust charges to yield
 targeted speed ranges of 45 to 65 kph for ex
 pressways, and 20 to 30 kph for arterial roads.
 These speed ranges were set based on the engi
 neering capacities of the expressways and
 arterial roads, respectively, and correspond
 mainly to Level of Service E (that is, "traffic
 flow near capacity with vehicles unable to
 change lanes because there are few usable traf
 fic gaps") and a small part of the next
 higher service level (Tan 2001; Willoughby
 2000). For a comprehensive list of ERP
 charges by time, location, and vehicular types
 on arterial roads as well as expressways, see
 Goh (2002) or visit the official Web site:
 http://traffic.smart.lta.sg/erprates.htm.
 Rate adjustments are made quarterly in Janu
 ary, April, July, and October. Thus, for exam
 ple, ERP charges were reduced in October 1999
 for various periods at a number of specific
 points when average speeds were found to have
 been above the target range. Moreover, rates
 are also lowered during the school holiday peri
 ods in May-June and November-December as
 significantly fewer trips are made, and as many
 families head overseas for holidays.
 Table 3 shows a comparison of the charges
 for cars by time and gantry location under
 ALS/RPS, and ERP charges upon implemen
 tation (September 1998), and as of January
 2003. According to Willoughby (2000), "the
 significant reduction in rates that has been
 effected under ERP appears to confirm the
 earlier research findings that ALS prices were
 often above the optimal level It is,
 however, interesting to note that evening con
 gestion along the Central Expressway (CTE)
 has caused speeds to drop to 10 kph especially
 between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Some frus
 trated drivers have suggested that the morning
 ERP along the CTE be extended to the eve
 ning peak hours as the quickest, most effective
 way to solve the problem. However, the
 government has announced that evening ERP
 to ease congestion on the CTE will be intro
 duced only after the opening of the North
 East MRT Line.
 As of February 2003, ERP charges were
 further fine-tuned to discourage motorists
 from slowing down or waiting at road shoul
 ders in anticipation of a downward adjustment
 in charges, or speeding to avoid paying higher
 charges. Instead of discrete changes in ERP
 rates that could be as much as $2.00 from
 one second to the next, the absolute amount
 of change in rates has been made smaller.
 For example, ERP rates at an expressway
 gantry used to be $3.00 from 8:30 a.m. to
 9:00 a.m. and $1.00 from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30
 a.m. The rates from February 2003 for the
 same gantry and time period have been ad
 justed to $3 from 8:30 a.m. to 8:55 a.m., $2
 from 8:55 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., $1.00 from 9:00
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 Table 3. Comparison of ALS/RPS and ERP Charges (Sep. and Apr. 1998 and Jan. 2003)
 for Cars (Restricted Zone and East Coast Parkway)_
 Time Slot
 Restricted Zone
 ALS  ERP (Sept 98)
 ERP (Jan
 03)
 East Coast Parkway
 RPS  ERP (Apr 98)
 ERP (Jan
 03)
 07:30 - 08:00  $2.00  $0.00*  $1.00  $0.50
 08:00 - 08:30
 08:30 - 09:00
 $3.00  $2.50*  $2.00*  $2.00
 $3.00  $2.50
 09:00 - 09:30  $2.50  $2.00
 $2.00  $1.00
 $1.50
 $1.00  $0.50
 09:30 -10:00
 10:00 -10:30
 10:30-11:00
 11:00-11:30
 11:30-12:00
 12:00 -12:30
 12:30-13:00
 13:00-13:30
 13:30-14:00
 14:00 -14:30
 14:30-15:00
 15:00-15:30
 15:30-16:00
 16:00-16:30
 16:30-17:00
 17:00-17:30
 17:30-18:00
 18:00-18:30
 18:30-19:00
 $2.00
 $3.00
 $1.50
 $2.50
 $1.50
 $1.00
 $0.00
 $0.50
 $1.00
 $1.50
 $2.00
 $1.00
 * Rates at Nicoll Highway gantry are $0.50 more
 Source: Singapore Land Transport Authority Web site at www.lta.gov.sg
 a.m. to 9:25 a.m., and $0.50 from 9:25 a.m.
 to 9:30 a.m.
 A positive outcome from the implementa
 tion of the ERP has been the reductions in
 road taxes and motor vehicle registration fees,
 among other things. A rebate of $200 per
 vehicle was given on the annual road tax
 payable for September 1998 to August 1999,
 and the rebate was increased to $250 for
 September 1999 to August 2000. Road tax
 rates for cars were lowered by 20 percent in
 2002. The total car population, which is
 controlled through a motor vehicle quota
 scheme (Toh 1992), has been allowed to
 increase from 375,217 in 1998 to 404,274
 in 2002.
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 ERP has without doubt permitted much
 finer tuning than the ALS/RPS, with less
 complexity and inconvenience for road users,
 and at lower administrative and labor costs
 to the government. It has certainly moved
 road pricing in Singapore much closer to
 optimal pricing.
 Conclusions
 Clearly, as a commercial center and tourist
 attraction, Singapore cannot be allowed to be
 come another Bangkok, where two-hour one
 way commutes at average speeds of six miles
 per hour on congested streets are not uncom
 mon. Thus, since 1975, Singapore has intro
 duced a series of measures to slow down the
 growth as well as the usage of motor vehicles
 in a land-scarce country. While some of the
 measures have been successful in their in
 tended effects, some problems have merely
 been shifted. In particular, as we have shown,
 the ALS shifted the problem of traffic conges
 tion in time and place. The Weekend Car
 Scheme led to some undesirable redistribu
 tional effects (since partially remedied by the
 Off-Peak Car Scheme).
 In earlier research, the first author found
 that the income elasticity of demand for the
 ownership of cars was 1.0 (Phang and Chin
 1990), while the second author found that the
 price elasticity of demand for the usage of cars
 was very high (Toh 1977). Thus, whereas an
 increase in the price of cars will not seriously
 discourage their purchase, a city-wide system
 of automatic tolls will seriously discourage
 their usage. Since it is usage and not ownership
 that causes traffic congestion, we believe that
 the newly instituted ERP is the best solution
 for Singapore's traffic congestion problem be
 cause it is non-intrusive and allocatively effi
 cient in that appropriate charges can be levied
 at different times and locations on different
 categories of motor vehicles, putting Singapore
 in the first-best world of Pareto optimality. It is
 also operationally non-intrusive and extremely
 flexible. Although there are still problems, the
 authorities are to be commended for their real
 ization that the problem of traffic congestion
 cannot be solved?it can only be managed.
 Thus the recent relaxation on the restrictive
 actions toward ownership and usage of cars
 has achieved traffic flows at reasonable but not
 highway speeds. This is appropriate because
 Singapore is not so much a country as it is a
 city-state. As such, it is not much different
 from such cities as New York, London, and
 Tokyo, and therefore must expect and be will
 ing to tolerate a reasonable amount of road
 congestion.
 As a postscript, it should be noted that Singa
 pore was not the first country to engage in area
 wide ERP. That distinction belongs to Hong
 Kong, which conducted experiments from July
 1983 to March 1985 (Hau 1990). The decision
 was not to proceed because among other things,
 there were privacy concerns, since motorists
 would receive periodic bills indicating where
 they went and at what time and date. But Singa
 pore has the distinction of having implemented
 the most comprehensive system of quotas and
 tolls in the world to curb both the ownership
 and usage of motor vehicles. Officials from
 Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia,
 the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and the United
 Kingdom, among many others, have come to
 study Singapore's road congestion pricing
 measures, while other Asian cities including
 Bangkok, Seoul, and Kuala Lumpur have con
 templated area-wide congestion pricing.
 The success of the draconian measures in
Singapore can be partly attributed to the fact
 hat Singapore is a very small island with a
 transportation grid largely insulated from for
 eign motorists, has a strong unwavering gov
 ernment committed to solving the problem, and
 is populated by an obedient law-abiding citi
 zenry. But can the measures successfully un
 dertaken by Singapore be implemented in the
 United States, Europe, and elsewhere? Explo
 ration of this question exceeds the scope of
 this article. Those interested in a detailed dis
 cussion of road congestion pricing in the
 United States and the rest of the world should
 see the article by Morrison (1986), and books
 edited by Gomez-Ibanez and Small (1994) and
 Button and Verhoef (1998).
 Endnote
 1 These social welfare functions represent three different
 approaches of aggregating individuals' utilities into social
 utilities. The multiplicative Nash welfare function is
 written as W = |II j E(Ui) |_1 where E(Uj) represents the
 expected utility of the ith individual. The Bentham-type
 welfare function is additive, 2i E(Uj), and the Sen function
 is (1-G), where jul is the mean utility level and G is
 the Gini coefficient (Wilson 1988).
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